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The People’s Republic of China (PRC) increasingly seeks to assert its interests as it approaches 
its national centennial.  This desire to be the predominant power in the Asia Pacific by casting 
the United States as a kind of transgressor encourages regional discontent in the process.  Like 
the US, many other regional powers share cultural exchange and significant economic ties to the 
PRC which complicate challenging its increasingly aggressive and coercive foreign policy.  
Countries like Vietnam and the Philippines are hesitant to play host to a significant US military 
presence fearing a retaliation and perhaps believing that the status quo is or already has shifted.  
This paper will examine the ways in which US Special Operations Forces (SOF) can support 
Vietnam and the Philippines within their respective foreign policy frames in countering Chinese 
coercion by using Joint Doctrine Note 1-19 Competition Continuum to identify avenues for 
future cooperation.  China’s approach to international politics does not seek open conflict to not 
disrupt its program of national development; however, they will take aggressive actions to 
dissuade and intimidate when they feel their position is being challenged.  Vietnam and the 
Philippines benefit from the assurance that SOF can offer in capacity building and represents a 
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As we approach the centennial of The People’s Republic of China, the United States, and 
its regional partners are increasingly forced to reckon with a China that is determined to assert its 
political and economic primacy over the Asia Pacific, nested within these is how China uses its 
conventional military and irregular capabilities to achieve.  China stresses its ascendance is 
rooted in a desire to ensure regional tranquility and engage peacefully with its neighbors in the 
Pacific.1  That assertion is inconsistent with observable realities in the Pacific as China 
increasingly utilizes economic, technological, military, and paramilitary tools to convince, 
coerce, and intimidate other states into cooperating with its desire to establish regional primacy.2  
According to the Jamestown Foundation, China’s political and military efforts are linked in 
promoting national development. Military strategy is directed by the country’s need to maintain 
robust economic growth and operate from a position where China’s internal stability and security 
is assured.3  China’s increasing tendency to project outwards is part of its evolving “active 
defense” doctrine which extends beyond its traditionally defined borders in order to safeguard its 
“territorial integrity.”4 This has led to several clashes and disputes with its neighbors as many 
small islands, coral reefs, and coastal shoals are claimed by several countries in the region.  
 
1 The State Council Information Office of the Peoples Republic of China, China’s Military Strategy (2015), Beijing:  
The State Council Information Office of the Peoples Republic of China, May, 2015, 3. https://jamestown.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/China%E2%80%99s-Military-Strategy-2015.pdf?x64579. 
2 Eric Sayers, “Thoughts on the Unfolding U.S.-Chinese Competition: Washington’s Policy Towards Beijing Enters its 
Next Phase,” War on the Rocks, February 9, 2021. https://warontherocks.com/2021/02/thoughts-on-the-
unfolding-u-s-chinese-competition-washingtons-policy-towards-beijing-enters-its-next-phase/. 
3 Timothy R. Heath, “Chapter 1: An Overview of China’s Military Strategy,” in Joe McReynolds (ed.), China’s 
Evolving Military Strategy, (Washington D.C.: Jamestown Foundation, April 2016), 14-15. 
4 Heath, China’s Evolving Military Strategy, 21. 
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 China possesses an increasingly formidable navy but has chosen to employ groups of 
coast guard cutters and maritime militia vessels to press its rights and seize territory upon which 
sophisticated artificial outposts are constructed that it can potentially militarize and defend as 
extensions of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).  Ships from the China Coast Guard (CCG) 
and its maritime militia increasingly harass and intimidate fishing fleets sometimes resulting in 
potentially lethal ramming incidents.5  This confluence of aggressive behaviors is increasingly 
alarming to China’s neighbors who are taking proactive measures such as escorting fishing 
fleets, buying new ships and weapons, and altering their strategic frames in official policy 
declarations.  Increasingly Vietnam and the Philippines are warming to international allies and 
agreements to challenge China’s hybrid approach. 
This paper will look at the ways the United States can assist two of the region’s principal 
victims of Chinese aggression: Vietnam and the Philippines.  Both continue to exhibit some 
reluctance to be caught between superpowers but that does not preclude the possibility that the 
US can establish a good working relationship using Special Operations Forces (SOF) as a 
gateway to future cooperation and military coordination.  They also don’t represent states where 
the US might require more extensive defense commitments in the near future.  Vietnam is 
reluctant to be seen as taking sides within the broader context of great power competition and has 
a foreign policy that prohibits formal defense alignment.  In the case of the Philippines US SOF 
has a history of providing security force assistance (SFA) and conducted civil affairs post-1945 
specifically during the Global War on Terror (GWOT).  Increasingly however the current 
administration under President Rodrigo Duterte has sought to embrace relations with China so 
 
5 Huong Le Thu, “Rough Waters Ahead for Vietnam-China Relations,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 




any increased US defense engagement is for the moment must be more limited in scope.  Both 
states represent good midrange cases where SOF can demonstrate value perhaps leading to more 
established defense relations in the future. The question is, how can the US Special Operations 
Forces support allies in the Asia Pacific in countering China’s ‘Active Defense’ approach?  This 
paper will look at the ways SOF can function and support partners increasingly in an era of great 
power competition. 
Background on the China Challenge 
 
To understand how to properly apply a framework for countering increased Chinese 
assertiveness in the Asia Pacific, we first need to better understand how the Chinese frame their 
strategic approach and how that relates to the broader cultural forces that shape Chinese strategic 
thinking.  Following the end of the Cold War the US entered a period of economic prosperity and 
military hegemony, however, just as quickly fissures arose in the policy community around the 
potential ascendance of China as certainly a regional power if not signature geopolitical rival to 
the United States.  In 1996 Denny Roy made some effort to conceptualize the different schools 
of thought on the subject characterizing this as the “China Threat” argument with different points 
of view arrayed in support or opposition to that framing.6   
Roy’s examination of these early discussions provide some context for how we view 
China today with the anti-China perspective arguing that China engaged in an increasing military 
buildup and modernization program developed with an eye toward eventually challenging the 
US.7  Beyond the military considerations there were concerns following events like the 
 
6 Denny Roy, “The ‘China Threat’ Issue: Major Arguments," Asian Survey 36, No. 8, (August 1996): p. 758. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2645437. 
7 Roy, “China Threat,” 760. 
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Tiananmen Square demonstration and China’s increasing territorial disputes with its neighbors 
alongside its belligerent attitude toward unification with Taiwan.8  A good summation of the 
argument against China comes from Roy quoting an editorial in Far Eastern Economic Review in 
which the columnist states, “Too often China’s actions appear founded on the assumption that its 
neighbors are, if not enemies, at least obstacles…”9 
The contrasting view laid out by Roy is one based on China’s need for economic 
development and therefore an ability to work within the international system which is buoyed by 
its benign if somewhat inward-looking approach to international affairs.10  Beyond that the anti-
threat school asserted that its military development was not out of alignment with a broader need 
to modernize, and a more capable China could prove to be valuable security in the Asia Pacific 
and was not likely to pursue regional hegemony.11    
China’s Political-Military Approach: 
 
 Unlike the United States where various administrations and defense institutions regularly 
publish national security strategies or studies in doctrinal development and areas of concern, 
China publishes its strategic framing much more irregularly and comprehensive translation and 
analysis takes time.12  The latest articulation of China’s broad strategic thinking is outlined in the 
defense whitepaper China’s Military Strategy (2015) and Science of Military Strategy from 2001 
and 2013, published by Academy of Military Science (AMS).  As I lack the language skills and 
cultural knowledge to assess these publications independently, I am relying on the Jamestown 
 
8 Ibid., 758-761. 
9 Ibid., 761.  
10 Ibid., 762-763. 
11 Ibid., 764-765. 




Foundation’s China’s Evolving Military Strategy as a guide through China’s strategic approach 
in these documents as well as my reading of China’s Military Strategy (2015) which they have 
translated into English.  Broadly speaking these Chinese government publications are best 
understood as extensions of China’s desire to safeguard and optimize China’s national 
development; military strategy is both subordinate to and inextricably linked to the leaderships 
broader political and economic aims.13  For the purposes of this paper the relevant portions these 
texts focus on discussion around how China increasingly employs what it terms “Active 
Defense” as a means of overcoming conventional asymmetries between China and the US as a 
means of avoiding a potentially catastrophic conflict that negatively impacts its development 
goals.  Active defense as the 2015 whitepaper notes is: 
A holistic approach will be taken to balance war preparation and war prevention, rights 
protection and stability maintenance, deterrence and warfighting, and operations in 
wartime and employment of military forces in peacetime. They lay stress on farsighted 
planning and management to create a favorable posture, comprehensively manage crises 
and resolutely deter and win wars.14  
This explanation helps demonstrate how China frames its current operational environment.  They 
make no effort to draw significant distinctions between the employment of military forces in 
peacetime and wartime.  China’s approach to “rights protection” which includes “territorial 
sovereignty,” and its expansive maritime claims are part of a proactive approach to seize the 
strategic high ground away from its internationally recognized borders.15  China’s recurring 
 
13 Timothy R. Heath, “Chapter 1: An Overview of China’s National Military Strategy,” in McReynolds (ed.) China’s 
Evolving Military Strategy, 14-15. 
14 The State Council Information Office of the Peoples Republic of China, China’s Military Strategy (2015), 10-11. 
https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/China%E2%80%99s-Military-Strategy-2015.pdf. 
15 The State Council Information Office of the Peoples Republic of China, China’s Military Strategy (2015), 12. 
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actions in the South China Sea which include altercations with the Philippines and Vietnam 
illustrate this proactive national development strategy backed by militarized force in action.  
 One such example is the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff.  The Philippines alongside 
China and Taiwan claim the fertile fishing territory but the Philippines prior to the 2012 
altercation with China largely controlled the shoal and the surrounding territory.16  As both sides 
sought to deescalate tensions discussions involving the US and the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) were making progress with seemingly both the Philippines and China 
backing down, as ASEAN refused to take a firm stand on the dispute both sides withdraw their 
vessels from the shoal. Shortly thereafter Chinese vessels returned and took full control over the 
area, erecting a barrier over the lagoon and maintaining a security presence that warns off 
Filipino fishing vessels to this day.17  China’s approach to rights protection is predicated on their 
specific conceptualization of deterrence, that China will act to maintain its national dignity if it 
feels its position is being challenged or compromised in a way that weakens their sovereignty.18 
As discussed however China’s increasingly sees the limitations in overt uses of military force to 
achieve their national interests especially as the dangers of escalation imperil its broader 
development agenda.19  With this in mind China is more likely to employ Military Operations 
Other Than War (MOOTW) unless it feels its sovereignty is significantly imperiled.20  These 
 
16 Michael Green, Kathleen Hicks, Zack Cooper, John Schaus, and Jake Douglas, “Counter-Coercion Series: 
Scarborough Shoal Standoff,” The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative and The Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, May 22, 2017. https://amti.csis.org/counter-co-scarborough-standoff/. 
 
17 Green et al., “Counter-Coercion Series: Scarborough Shoal Standoff.” 
18 John Costello and Peter Mattis, “Chapter 6: Electronic Warfare and the Renaissance of Chinese Information 
Operations,” in McReynolds (ed.) China’s Evolving Military Strategy, 200. 
19 Morgan Clemens, “Chapter 11: PLA Thinking on Military Operations Other Than War,” in McReynolds (ed.) 
China’s Evolving Military Strategy, 363 
20 Clemens, “Chapter 11: PLA Thinking on Military Operations Other Than War,” 364. 
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methods include influence operations, coercion and intimidation and form the basis of likely 
future actions against it neighbors. 
Background 
 
Overview of the Current Challenge: 
 
Just as the United States shifted away from irregular concerns such as terrorism, 
extremism, and insurgency, an abiding contention seems to be that even potential peer 
adversaries, principally Russia and China, have observed how the US framed and conducted 
operations from the Gulf War onwards. Adapting themselves to shaping the information sphere 
prior to conducting any potential kinetic action.21  Addressing conventional US strengths 
encompass everything from Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) of the cyber world to more 
subtle influence campaigns making use of time-tested methods related to Cold War espionage.  
As the Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America makes 
clear: 
The central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term, 
strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist 
powers. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent 
with their authoritarian model—gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, 
diplomatic, and security decisions.22 
 
21Costello and Mattis, “Chapter 6: Electronic Warfare and the Renaissance of Chinese Information Operations,” 
188. 
22 Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: 
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge, James Mattis, Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 
2018, 2. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. 
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The current abiding concern for the US defense policy community is not only how does 
the US array the joint force to combat this challenge, but how do we without sparking an armed 
clash between nuclear armed superpowers.  It is undesirable to cede whole nations and regions to 
a revisionist power like China.  All aspects of national power will need to play a role, but the 
importance of an irregular and adaptable approach modified from its Global War on Terror 
(GWOT) framing remains an area of intense interest and discussion.  US Special Operations 
Forces have led the way in the GWOT, but there are disagreements about utility and the need for 
reorganization to better contend with state actors.  Within peer competition the measure of 
success is less the impact direct action has on a terror cell than an entrenched effort frustrating 
broad political and economic aims.  In recognition of the importance of irregular warfare in 
confronting potential adversaries the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a Summary of the 
Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy in which they state, “The 
Department’s approach to irregular warfare must evolve to address the full spectrum of 
competition and conflict against state adversaries, while sustaining campaigns against select non-
state actors.”23  While it is clear SOF will have an important role to play in Irregular Warfare 
(IW) competition involving state actors the questions and disagreements presented here will 
guide how we anticipate moving forward. 
Exploring a History of Special Operations: 
 
Discussion and indeed popular books and films have often recounted the heroic exploits 
of specific missions and individuals within the US SOF community, but it is unusual to have 
 
23 Department of Defense, Summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National Defense Strategy, James 




comprehensive studies done about their proper application or developing framework for 
conceptualizing their use.  In his book Special Operations in World War II: British and 
American Irregular Warfare Andrew L. Hargreaves tries to trace the co-evolution of American 
and British SOF during the war.  Hargreaves summation is that without an effective pre-war 
formulation or guidebook to draw upon, British and American SOF evolved “in response to 
opportunity and exigency,” this does not mean neither country employed irregular units in the 
past but that the formation was largely ad hoc in response to an arising challenge.24   
  Hargreaves is careful throughout the book to draw distinctions in the development and 
missions between the types of units that undertake SOF, but his larger point is the character of 
IW requires fitting specially trained “elite” personnel to a broad range of missions unsuited to 
conventional massed forces.25  The broader evolution of SOF in WWII lies outside the scope of 
this study, but there is a very valid point Hargreaves study points to, namely that in the face of 
unorthodox challenges, capabilities and missions must be reoriented to meet current threats.  As 
SOF increasingly pivots to Great Power Competition (GPC) adopting new approaches to 
adversaries and allies will be necessary for success.  
Similarly, William McRaven published his own study of special operations in which he 
narrowed the accepted Joint Chiefs of Staff definition to apply to his selected case studies to 
develop several overlapping theories.26  Within his study McRaven sought to develop two 
explanatory concepts, the first being the need for SOF to establish “Relative Superiority” in the 
 
24 Andrew L. Hargreaves, Special Operations in World War II: British and American Irregular Warfare, Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 2013, 270. 
25 Andrew L. Hargreaves, Special Operations in World War II: British and American Irregular Warfare, Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 2013, 4-6. 
26 William McRaven, SPEC OPS Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice, Novato: Presidio 
Press, 1995, 2-3. 
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early stages of an operation to overwhelm an adversary and achieve their objectives before an 
adversary can counter.27  The other was a formula for SOF to achieve relative superiority 
encompassing six principles, “simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose…”28  
To establish his framework McRaven lays out eight historical cases where the missions 
succeeded or failed based on their application of these principles, and if they were able to 
achieve relative superiority.  Certainly, McRaven’s framework and case selection works well in 
determining outcomes, but all his cases hold to the more popular conception of what constitutes a 
special operation, namely kinetic action against a selected target for military purposes.  
While both studies provide us with histories and frameworks for some of the types of 
operations conducted by SOF and good context for better understanding special operations as an 
evolving concept, but they do not address the political frames in which SOF might be required to 
operate before direct contact with an aggressor.  In effect these are hot war studies that while 
informative do not help us better understand a broadening conceptualization for using SOF to 
offset Chinese aggression employed below a certain threshold of violence. 
 US Special Operations Forces do have an established history of operating in the Pacific 
specifically to support regional partners in non-combat functions both before and largely during 
the Vietnam era.   Writing a brief history on the 1st Special Forces Group operations in the Asia 
Pacific Eugene Piasecki recounts how following his inauguration in 1961 President Kennedy 
emphasized the need for a more flexible response in countering communist aggression and 
irregular warfare in the developing world.29  This period saw the development of regional 
 
27 McRaven, SPEC OPS, 4-7.   
28 Ibid, 8. 




Special Action Forces (SAFs) that were responsible for developing and overseeing Internal 
Defense Plans (IDPs) within their respective areas of responsibility.30  In the Pacific region 
Special Action Force Asia (SAFASIA) was made up of the 1st Special Forces Group consisting 
of Special Forces (SF), Civil Affairs (CA), Military Intelligence (MI), a medical detachment and 
an engineering detachment all arrayed to support local partners increasingly as part of an adapted 
Foreign Internal Defense (FID) mission.31   
Beginning in the early 1960’s SAFASIA elements based in Hawaii and Okinawa were 
deployed to Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and increasingly South Vietnam to train both 
military and police forces.32  Building these early cooperative relationships established the 
framework for employing SOF internationally.  Prior to any US military deployment, the host 
country must first extend the invitation which had to be approved by both the US Ambassador 
and the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG), solidifying the idea that 
these operations were intended to be joint cooperative ventures between states not simply a US 
mission directing partner actions, as joint efforts produced dividends for the host country the 
approval process increasingly became a formality.33  Beyond training local military and police 
forces in FID and Counterinsurgency (COIN) SAFASIA detachments increasingly focused on 
the CA mission, providing training on heavy equipment, improving sanitation and providing 
medical care and training to the local government and the civilian population.34  By the late 
1960’s regional SAF commands had established Disaster Assistance and Relief Teams (DART) 
 
30 Piasecki, “Special Action Force Asia,” 2. 
31 Ibid, 3 
32 Ibid, 3. 
33 Ibid, 3-4 
34 Ibid, 4. 
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to provide assistance in the wake of natural disasters, including flooding in Pakistan in the 
Filipino of Island of Luzon in 1971 and 1972 respectively.35  
Teams from the 1st Special Forces Group were literally lifesavers during both calamities. 
Operating rescue boats, inoculating civilians, distributing food, and directing rebuilding 
efforts, the DARTs saved lives and salvaged livelihoods, and earned America many 
friends.36 
As the Vietnam war wound down the theater mission of SAFASIA began to see a reduction in 
operations and exercises but saw some short-term deployments to the Philippines in 1971 
assisting the local government in a robust school building effort. Utilizing skills and courses 
SAFASIA’s Operational Detachments had learned in basic construction, they lived and worked 
alongside villagers demonstrating the value of SOF’s varied capabilities to cement relationships 
as part of a humanitarian mission.37  By 1974 SAFASIA theater mission had largely been 
deemed unnecessary and the command was discontinued in favor of a small SOF presence in 
South Korea, but was eventually reconstituted in 1984 under the 1st Special Forces Group 
(Airborne) once again based in Okinawa.38 
Thinking of SOF as a Deterrent:  
 
There is little disagreement within the study of SOF that contending with irregular, 
hybrid, or grey zone competition – presuming those terms encompass a good demarcation from 
understood conventional challenges posed by peer adversaries – will require a distinctly different 
 
35 Ibid, 5.  
36 Ibid, 5. 
37 Ibid, 5-6. 
38 Ibid, 6-7. 
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approach than has been employed in the counterterrorism mission.  There is increasing 
scholarship driven by interest in how best to conceptualize and prepare for “Gray Zone” conflict 
with state actors, most of whom will employ irregular tactics, techniques, and proxies to frustrate 
conventional deterrence frameworks.   
In a report for Joint Special Operations University, Robert Haddick argues that an 
improved deterrence framework is necessary to counter state employment of irregular techniques 
and that SOF has a leading role to play.39  In his analysis the capabilities already exist within 
SOF to adapt to this environment.  What is required is a reconceptualization of deterrence that is 
prepared to deny and impose costs on states practicing unconventional warfare.40  Haddick 
argues an improved and understood deterrence framework is needed by both the US policy 
community and allies, the question is how quickly it can be established as a response to events 
that are currently ongoing and have been for some time.  Haddick’s rationale, that SOF’s varied 
capabilities will play a leading role as a response to hybrid challenges is sound.41 
The Limited Utility of SOF in Great Power Competition: 
 
Hal Brands and Tim Nichols offer a nuanced critique of SOF’s utility in GPC.  Brands 
and Nichols assert that current SOF deployments, missions, training, and preparation are slow in 
pivoting to peer competitors.42  Even with that framing they do not discount the importance of 
 
39 Joint Special Operations University, How Do SOF Contribute to Comprehensive Deterrence?, Robert Haddick, 
JSOU Report 17-11, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida: JSOU University Press, 2017, 65-66. 
https://jsou.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=51791971. (Accessed 02/13/2021). 
40 Joint Special Operations University, How Do SOF Contribute to Comprehensive Deterrence?, 67. 
41 Ibid., 66-67. 
42 Hal Brands and Tim Nichols, “Special Operations Forces and Great-Power Competition in the 21st Century,” 





SOF in countering state adversaries and how they can be effectively employed going forward.  
Unlike Haddick they question the utility of SOF as a deterrent and suggest special operations can 
no longer serve as the force guiding the strategy like they have during the war on terror.43  They 
do believe SOF will have important missions and provide a requisite flexibility in intelligence 
gathering, partner coordination, and in a worst-case scenario conducting strategic raids, among 
other potential missions.44   
While many other researchers have chosen to emphasize the importance of SOF’s 
flexibility and adaptability in countering asymmetric state aggression, Brands and Nichols 
believe an encompassing approach relying more on conventional diplomatic, economic, and 
intelligence tools to frame and counter revisionist actors ahead of SOF is needed.45 A valid point 
made by Brands and Nichols is the recognition of a change in the military realities for the United 
States, that we can no longer expect to have maximal freedom to operate against adversaries in 
environments where the US enjoys broad conventional dominance.  They argue the US will no 
longer be able to “shape” the battlefield, conduct kinetic operations and return to relative safety 
whether that is fortified bases or the end of a mission, and that peer competition means SOF’s 
role will be diminished as the US wages broader influence campaigns below the threshold of 
armed conflict.46  
The Potential for SOF in Great Power Competition: 
 
In contrast to those that see a more limited role of SOF in countering revisionist states 
like Russia and China some scholars argue SOF can still shape the environment and continue 
 
43 Brands and Nichols, “Special Operations Forces and Great-Power Competition,” 2.  
44 Ibid., 2.  
45 Ibid., 4. 
46 Ibid., 4. 
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through the spectrum conflict within the gray zone.  Phillip Lohaus constructed a framework 
around existing models of conflict wherein the role SOF plays rises or falls across various phases 
which he terms, “peace, shaping, war and survival.”47  The broader concept is represented by 
Lohaus below:  
 
Figure 1: Force Utility Curves Across Conflict Stages.48 
 
 
47 Phillip Lohaus, “Special Operations Forces in the Gray Zone: An Operational Framework for Using Special 
Operations Forces in the Space Between War and Peace,” Special Operations Journal 2, No. 2 (2016): 82, Accessed 
02/08/2021, DOI: 10.1080/23296151.2016.1239989. 
48 Lohaus, “Special Operations Forces in the Gray Zone,” 83.  
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His framework delineates both a continuum of conflict in the gray zone as well as the 
relative importance of SOF and their specific mission set throughout.  Steep declines or periods 
of limited SOF utility denoted by the white line do not represent a complete absence or dramatic 
reduction in capability.  Lohaus explains he is merely trying to illustrate the conditions under 
which more conventional approaches dominate which would naturally include open conflict as 
well as Building Partner Capacity (BPC) at the start of this spectrum.49  The lower portion titled 
“Perceptions” is meant to gauge how different actors frame hostilities.  Lohaus assesses that the 
European framework of pre-conflict shaping (blue) is short as committing forces to any theater 
suggests that hostilities are inevitable.50  The green box is more closely aligned with US thinking 
where the commitment of resources and personnel is more gradual and there is a more distinct 
break between shaping and military action.51  Finally the red box is more closely aligned with 
Russian and Chinese approaches employing a broader spectrum of forces early to seize the 
advantage ahead of a potential conventional conflict with the US who they fear maintains a 
decisive advantage.52   
While Lohaus’s framework is valuable in sketching out a continuum of conflict within 
the gray zone, it still may be too linear in conceptualizing a continuum where the US can choose 
when to compete instead of one directed at a peer adversary who has achieved or surpassed 
conventional parity with the US.  Kaley Scholl essentially makes this argument in an essay for 
Small Wars Journal focusing on China wherein she states, “…China is using all means at its 
nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national objectives.  The US is losing this war 
 
49 Ibid., 83-84.  
50 Ibid., p. 85 
51 Ibid., p. 85 
52 Ibid., p. 85. 
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because gray operations fall outside traditional US defense strengths.”53  Scholl has a good grasp 
of China’s political warfare strategy and focuses on them as the primary challenge for the US 
over other scholars explored here whose framing is more about conceptualizing the SOF pivot to 
fight state adversaries.  Scholl’s article smartly builds from one of the few real-life examples we 
have of SOF countering a Chinese gray zone operation in Nigeria. A Special Forces ODA paired 
with Psychological Operations Detachment disrupted Chinese construction of a port by 
influencing Nigerian workers and organizing protests using a concerted information campaign.54  
Afterwards SOF and the Nigerian security forces discovered the Chinese planned to use the port 
for military purposes making it a potential target in future conflict.  Passing this information on 
to the US IC they developed an analysis for embassy officials to brief Nigerian government who 
subsequently seized the land ending any possibility of China’s development of the port.55  Scholl 
writes up a series of concisely drawn policy recommendations in which the US can better 
leverage funding and organization to use SOF in gray zone competitions.  She argues that 
conventional conflicts are unlikely to occur precisely because the of the potential dangers 
associated with nuclear escalation.56  Ultimately Scholl argues using more empowered state 
institutions supporting a SOF mission that emphasizes political warfare over kinetic action is an 
imperative for competing with China’s gray zone operations.57 
SOF’s Role in Providing Indigenous Support: 
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In Steve Lewis’s “Special Operations Forces’ Role in Political Warfare.”  Lewis’s applies 
the DIME framework (diplomatic, information, military, and economic) to examples where SOF 
can assist US country teams more broadly to extend a central government’s ability to better meet 
their people’s needs.58  Lewis uses a series of historical examples and then establishes a broad 
lesson across each of the DIME frames for SOF to potentially apply in countering political 
warfare, and help establish US cooperative relationships with countries susceptible to adversary 
manipulation or internal disruption.59  Lewis’s framing is valuable in illustrating how SOF can 
be part of a broader effort but his examples largely relate to governments or movements 
overcoming internal disruptions, not direct and predatory techniques employed by an organized 
external actor like China.  In the past SOF has demonstrated efficacy in remedying internal 
issues that might reduce susceptibility to foreign influence but resisting China’s hybrid strategy 
which might not be strictly regarded as overtly threatening at times requires a more focused 
approach.  
This idea links to a thesis from Sean R. Coffman, Ron J. Shumaker, and Jeff M. Givens at 
the Naval Post Graduate School.  In their study they explain: 
The Gray Zone environment and methods of irregular warfare are exceedingly complex 
in their own ways and would not be well suited to the eighteen-year-old riflemen straight 
out of high school, with little life experience. These multifaceted and demanding 
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situations require an individual who is a warrior and diplomat, interchangeable as needed. 
This layered identity is the true virtue of Special Operations Forces.60 
The idea that the US cannot hope to rely on a strictly conventional response to a hybrid threat is 
valid. By the time the US injects significant resources into a campaign an adversary might have 
already seized a decisive advantage while also introducing an increasing amount of uncertainty 
and opportunities for mistakes and miscalculation.  These types of errors could take the form of 
aircraft and ships shadowing each other too closely resulting in accidents or worse as younger 
personnel do not know how to appropriately respond to provocations.  Coffman et al. rely on 
Bureaucratic Politics Model developed by Graham Allison and Mark Halperin measuring the 
interplay between senior and junior players and the way in which SOF can help inform policy 
makers of realities on the ground, potentially leading to more effective outcomes.61  Coffman et 
al. employ this framework in two case studies that involved gray zone challenges in Somalia and 
the Philippines.62  Examining each case they develop a model for emphasizing a need to 
understand and properly SOF in an irregular warfare context: 
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Figure 2. Gray Zone Conflict.63 
 
Ultimately, they determine that in the case of the Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines 
(OEF-P) policy makers exhibited both an effective understanding of SOF capabilities as well as 
the proper framing around long-term objectives leading to clear guidance on operational 
parameters which contributed to the long term success of OEF-P.64  Somalia was ultimately not  
successful in their estimation because “senior players” constrained SOF’s mission and failed to 
anticipate how a wider range of capabilities was required to lead to a successful outcome.65 
Like Coffman et al. Linda Robinson also looked at SOF’s 14-year period of assisting the 
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) following the 9/11 attacks.  The mission of SOF in OEF-
P was to advise the AFP in countering the Al Qaeda linked Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and 
Jemaah Islamiya (JI) that had expanded their operations in Philippines, targeting Americans and 
foreigners more openly.66  As Robinson explains the US mission in the Philippines was non-
combat and intended to engender within the AFP and related security institutions an enhanced 
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capability to combat terrorism but also served a vital civil affairs and psychological operations 
function, linking Filipino institutions to the local populations needs as a means of luring them 
away from the extremists.67  More broadly SOF was used to support other US and Filipino 
agencies in their missions facilitating partner cooperation and coordination with a much smaller 
US military footprint.68  As the US mission began to draw to a close a reduction in violence and 
an increase in local confidence in the government of the Philippines reliably indicated the 
operation had been a success.69  This backs up Coffman et al. in their assessment of OEF-P.  
What neither study really addresses however are the broader implications SOF-Filipino 
cooperation indicates for peer competition with China.  Coffman and his co-authors analysis 
directly address gray zone operations but does so strictly with respect to internal disruption 
situated around extremism and insurgency.  Robinson only makes one brief reference to China 
and the South China Sea (SCS), but she does make the point that the history of SOF cooperation 
in the Philippines bodes well for the potential for more meaningful future cooperation.70 
Defense Department Pivots to Great Power Competition: 
 
While there is consistent agreement that SOF inevitably has a role in peer competition 
outside of open conflict, the previous studies discussed either focus too much on SOF’s role in 
armed conflict (McChrystal, Hargreaves) or look to approach the subject of SOF in GPC in 
broader terms (Lohaus, Lewis, Brands and Nichols).  The development of Joint Doctrine Note 1-
19 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) which will be referred to by its title Competition Continuum 
hereafter is an attempt to conceptualize a security environment and deterrence framework that 
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accounts for the increasingly complicated interaction between states in a globalized world. The 
Competition Continuum makes the case that framing state competition must adapt to 
circumstances where the US will be challenged by states perhaps routinely in ways that do not 
meet the distinct divide between peace and armed conflict.71  That break in categorization is not 
merely a line of understanding for the American people but one that denotes where and how the 
DOD must begin to commit resources and inevitably incur losses.72 
The Competition Continuum framework is an attempt to orient the DOD toward a shift in 
thinking.  Breaking competition into three categories, “cooperation, competition below armed 
conflict, and armed conflict.”73  During each of these phases the JCS advocates for cooperation 
not just between US agencies and forces but as a matter of necessity with international partners 
in achieving US objectives as well as their own.74  To that end this study will assess the validity 
of using the Joint Doctrine Note’s portion on “Campaigning Through Cooperation” in 
conjunction alongside the SOF mission set described in A Vision for 2021 and Beyond the 1st 
Special Forces Command – Airborne’s framework for participating in an era of Great Power 
Competition (GPC).75   
The 1st SFC – Airborne’s paper on reorienting SOF capabilities for a new era discusses 
the linked roles its component branches play as part of an overall SOF mission set. Special 
Forces (SF) perform a variety of functions under the umbrella of US Special Operations 
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Command (USSOCOM) which include but are not limited to security force assistance (SFA), 
unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense, direct action, counterterrorism, foreign 
humanitarian assistance and counterinsurgency.76  The role of SF is generally to maintain and 
provide security both for and with local partners as well as SOF’s other components.77  Civil 
Affairs forms the backbone of SOF’s role within the competition continuum, they provide the 
bulk of cultural knowledge and language expertise and are the core element in civil network 
development and engagement (CNDE).78  The role SOF CA teams play is to provide other 
elements with a comprehensive understanding of the local situation and the potential impact of 
operations during cooperation and post-conflict phases.79   The Psychological Operations branch  
(PO) of SOF are the principle practitioners of Military Information Support Operations (MISO), 
PO elements assess vulnerabilities and potential points of influence within the local 
environment.80 PO support the CA and SF branches by helping to cultivate favorable narratives 
and in identifying and counteracting vulnerabilities that an adversary might seek to exploit 
within along the competition continuum.81  By looking at the ways practitioners anticipate to 
contend with aggression below armed conflict this paper will apply SOF’s framing of its mission 
to working with potential allies in challenging Chinese aggression and coercion in the Asia 
Pacific.  Like Scholl A Vision for 2021 and Beyond also makes use of Nigeria as an exemplar of 
cooperation below the threshold of armed conflict suggesting that forward presence and 
commitment to engaging with partners openly successfully thwarted a Chinese attempt to 
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establish a strategic foothold in Nigeria.82  By applying these same principles to Vietnam and the 
Philippines the US might have some similar success in the future. 
  In the current environment the US must interact and deal with China across the political 
and economic spectrum even as it is arraying and organizing its armed forces to deter US 
military coordination with regional partners.  At yet another level, states globally, specifically 
those that abut China’s principal interests in the South China Sea, must carefully consider how 
their cooperation with the US on security coordination will impact their broader dealings with 
China.  In effect they practice their own competition continuum which recognizes the importance 
of China to their economic development.  David Shambaugh notes this in an interview for CSIS 
saying that while the US maintains an edge in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and has good 
relationships when it comes to security cooperation with Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), when it comes to trade China dramatically outpaces the US, $500 billion to $350 
billion.83  Shambaugh observes that ASEAN countries have trouble conceptualizing how best to 
respond to Chinese military provocations in East Asia given their relative military disadvantage 
and their close economic ties to the PRC.84  This presents an opportunity for the US to better 
frame security assistance as cooperation between partners in stark contrast to China’s approach 
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While enacting the full Competition Continuum framework necessarily includes 
discussion of the potential for armed conflict, the aim of SOF enacting partner coordination 
particularly against an adversary like China is to build and sustain a regional partnership below 
the threshold of violence.  To that end this study will assess the validity of using the Joint 
Doctrine Note’s portion on “Campaigning Through Cooperation.” By examining the way areas 
SOF can build partner capacity either by providing expertise in SFA, FID and UW among other 
functions practiced by Special Forces teams or acting alongside their CA and PO brethren to 
better understand and prepare their operating environments in the face of potential state and 
extremist aggression is a mission that US Special Operations Forces train for routinely under 
their Special Operations Command (SOCOM) umbrella.86  By undertaking a qualitative 
assessment of Vietnam and the Philippines interactions with China this study will assess the 
ways SOF can be effective in capacity building as China is shifting to an ‘active defense’ 
approach that relies on intimidation and limited aggression over dedicated armed conflict.   
To make an assessment this paper will rely on how SOF can potentially aid Vietnam and 
the Philippines working within their proscribed prescribed policy positions.  In the case of 
Vietnam’s long established “Three Nos” policy which prohibit formal alliances, foreign bases, 
and strategic alignment, and the recently added corollary emphasizing opposition to aggression.87  
Assessing the Philippines requires looking at their National Security Policy document for 2017 
through 2022, and their goals and strategic objectives that pertain to foreign engagement and 
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security cooperation. 88  Looking at these policy stances I will determine if SOF can build a 
framework for ongoing cooperation with Vietnam and the Philippines using the JCS Joint 
Doctrine Note 1-19 Competition Continuum. Campaigning through cooperation includes the 
following criteria in Box 1 for ways the US can potentially build on engaging with partners on 
their terms which maximize security coordination over an extended period: 
 
Box 1. Competition Continuum.89 
 
Case Selection Method: 
 
The Philippines and Vietnam represent midrange examples of long-term strategic 
partnerships for the US in offsetting or rolling back PRC attempts to establish strategic 
dominance over the region.  Both countries have a complicated relationship to the US and China 
from a security standpoint but their ongoing interactions with Beijing over disputes in the South 
China Sea mark them as critical allies for the US.  While the US must expect that they will 
continue to engage in robust trade and development programs with the PRC, there are 
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exploitable opportunities in building security capacity that can help frustrate China’s ongoing 
efforts to expand its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) inside its Nine-dash line.90 Within that line 
China has ongoing territorial disputes with the both the Philippines and Vietnam over a number 
of island chains including the Paracel Islands, The Spratly Islands, and the Scarborough Shoal, 
all claimed wholly or in part by a number of regional powers including Vietnam, Brunei, 
Malaysia, China, and the Philippines.91  Beyond these examples China claims the Senkaku 
Islands which are administered by Japan but are also claimed by Taiwan.92 
Taiwan and Japan fall outside the scope of this study as both represent significant red 
lines for US conflict vis a vis China.  Japan hosts a significant US military presence and US-
Japanese Security cooperation is an established routine backed up Treaty of Mutual Cooperation 
and Security between the United States and Japan. As for Taiwan, increasingly the US has 
engaged in Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) through the Taiwan Straits as a signal 
to China that the US is prepared to enforce Taiwan’s sovereignty.93  In either case support for 
both countries is an established part of US military signaling to China often involving significant 
resources and a firm commitment that aggressive acts could be met with significant retaliation.   
Even with the memory of the US-Vietnam War hanging over both countries, Vietnam’s 
more recent and intensifying disputes with China have created an opening for improved 
relations.  Vietnam has softened somewhat on its “Three Nos” policy which was intended to 
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communicate non-hostility to Beijing, circumstances are shifting with the increasing 
assertiveness practiced by Beijing in the South China Sea (SCS).94  Vietnam represented a good 
case to examine for the US military and SOF in particular to begin to establish a framework for 
security cooperation long term as Vietnam has specifically sought to avoid permanent basing of 
foreign forces as well as reluctance to align itself geopolitically with one state against another.95  
Vietnam also contrasts with the Philippines where a framework for mutual defense exists but has 
been waning as relations between Filipino President Rodrigo Duterte and Beijing had been 
warming until recently. 
While the US and the Philippines have enjoyed good security cooperation since the 1999 
adoption of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), recent actions by Filipino President Rodrigo 
Duterte including his decision to suspend the VFA in February of 2020 have cast doubt on the 
future of security cooperation between both countries.  In the interim between that decision and 
this writing however Duterte has made the decision to suspend sunsetting the VFA twice as 
tensions have increased between the Philippines and China with the next deadline set for August  
2021.96  With this in mind the US should find ways of demonstrating the value of US security 
cooperation in advising and assisting the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) by 
demonstrating how on even a small scale SOF can lend expertise in opposing China’s 
Informationized approach below the threshold of open conflict.  Both cases represent a spectrum 
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of analysis in which Vietnam is an opportunity for the US to build security through good faith 
interactions, while the Philippines may well represent a relationship that needs to be salvaged.  
There are obviously other structural barriers to more intensive security cooperation 
involving SOF in both countries.  Besides President Duterte’s frustration with the US and his 
wavering support for the VFA, US involvement is contingent on an invitation from the host 
country and some formulation around the status of forces and their role in education and training 
of local forces.97 The Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State (DOS) have a 
congressionally authorized budget for International Military Education and Training (IMET), 
once agreements have been made IMET can be used to govern the conduct of partner forces if 
their actions run contrary to established US values.98 In the case of Vietnam where the post-war 
relationship is improving but has not yet moved beyond symbolic actions and statements over a 
desire to maintain regional stability the US has made overtures to increase security exchange.  
The US has transferred US Coastguard cutters to the Vietnamese and US vessels have made port 
calls in recent years in addition to the US lifting prohibitions on the sale of lethal arms to 
Vietnam.99 The Vietnamese however are reticent both to expend an increased portion of their 
defense budget on expensive US weapon systems as well as concern about long term US 
commitment to region in the face of increasing tensions with China, in the near term close 
bilateral security cooperation with Vietnam may be questionable but the US can potentially 
remedy that reality by offering more tangible and proactive assurances.100  
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One further area of concern involving future US military cooperation with both countries 
are ongoing concerns about their civil rights records and how their security forces have 
committed human rights violations and been used to suppress internal dissent.  Both Vietnam 
and the Philippines have been criticized by the international community, the DOS, and human 
rights organizations repeatedly.  In their 2019 assessment Duterte’s Philippines has illegally 
detained political opponents and judges critical of his “drug war” which has resulted in many 
extra-judicial killings.101  According to Human Rights Watch there are as many as 23,000 
homicides currently under investigation relating to Duterte’s drug war with many believed to 
have been summarily carried out by police or gangs working in collusion with the administration 
anti-drug policies.102  The ripple effects of Duterte’s domestic policies has caused him to lash out 
at political opponents and the press, increasing the degree to which his administration has been 
criticized internationally and straining relations with the US.103  While this study will mainly 
examine the Philippines strategic objectives with respect to international affairs, one of the 
policies stated objectives is to codify Duterte’s policies around drug enforcement and domestic 
order.104 
Similarly, Vietnam has its own problems with human rights violations in a way that 
would complicate security cooperation with the US.  Security forces and state structures limit 
free expression and political organization that runs contrary to government policy.105  The 
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government also restricts freedom of the press and the publics access to information which 
includes social media like Facebook and search engines like google which are heavily censored, 
no independent media outlets can operate freely within Vietnam.106 
It is reasonable to say that prior to more comprehensive security cooperation US 
leadership would have to have at least some of these concerns addressed with at least meaningful 
attention paid to correcting the most severe violations, the Filipino practice of extra-judicial 
killings likely being one example and that may not be meaningfully rectified until President 
Duterte leaves office in 2022.  The Leahy Law prohibits funding or training to support states or 
regimes that have been determined to be perpetrating gross violations of human rights 
(GVHR).107  It is important to note exceptions to the Leahy Law are possible, US security forces 
can participate with local governments in the event of natural disaster or other national 
emergencies, it also possible for partner security forces to be vetted though a “remediation” 
process wherein they have made significant efforts to overcome past violations.108  Finally part 
of security force assistance and training might include efforts to improve a partners human rights 
record where exceptions have been discussed and deemed appropriate by the Secretaries of State 
and Defense.109  It remains unclear the extent to which Vietnam and Philippines can make 
adjustments in a way that allows for a successful vetting and opens the door for future 
cooperation however the following sections focus on the ways SOF can support both states when 
in competition with China. 
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Despite an ideological kinship, the China-Vietnam relationship has endured both intense 
diplomatic and economic disputes as well as the occasional military and paramilitary encounter.  
In the late 1970’s and 1980’s Vietnam and China fought over land in the South China Sea with 
China attacking a Vietnamese force in 1988 seizing the Johnson South Reef.110 For years China 
has increasingly sought to secure maritime control over several strategic small island chains, 
coastal reefs, and low-lying shoals claimed by Vietnam and other countries in the South China 
Sea.  While relations between the two countries have ebbed and flowed over the years, 
increasingly Vietnam recognizes China’s actions are part of a pattern of coercion and 
intimidation that are designed to bring the smaller countries in the region to heel, something that 
China’s own statements declare outright. Former US National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster 
recounts how in a meeting at ASEAN in 2010 China’s foreign minister flatly told the assembled 
delegates “China is a big country, and you are all small countries.”111  McMaster asserts that 
China’s ongoing efforts toward national renewal are part of a broader range of efforts to 
“establish a new tributary system,” in the region where countries like Vietnam and the 
Philippines are required to bend to its will.112 
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In recent years China has used the China Coast Guard (CCG) and its lightly armed 
maritime militia force to safeguard and press the rights of Chinese fishermen and mining 
cooperatives to develop territory inside Vietnam’s claimed EEZ.  In 2014 China used these 
proxies to defend China’s placement of an oil rig inside Vietnamese territorial waters resulting in 
an armed standoff.113  China’s 2015 defense white paper codifies these kinds of actions as 
doctrine stating, “Integrated combat forces will be employed to prevail in system-vs-system 
operations featuring information dominance, precision strikes and joint operations.”114  
Eventually China withdrew the oil rig, but it instilled in Vietnam a need to more proactively 
prepare for future provocations by seeking international remediation as well as enhancing their 
own military capabilities.115  In its own 2019 defense white paper Hanoi updated its “Three Nos” 
policy adding a fourth where it condemns threats and use of force intending to coerce Vietnam’s 
compliance with the implication being this more strident position followed from increasing 
Chinese provocations.116  This change came before a potentially lethal 2020 incident in which a 
Chinese coast guard cutter rammed and sank a Vietnamese fishing boat, abandoning the crew to 
be rescued by Vietnamese coast guard.117  Vietnam is increasingly signaling its willingness to 
cooperate with international partners in stabilizing the situation in the South China Sea, and 
ongoing clashes with China represent an opportunity for the US to build on its steadily 
improving relationship with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. 
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The Three Laws of Robotics: 
 Isaac Asimov conceived of the “Three Laws of Robotics” as a kind of perfect logical 
loop wherein humans should be shielded from potential harm from their artificial creation.  In 
brief, a robots programming prevents it from harming humans or allowing humans to be harmed, 
they must obey orders except when in conflict with the above, and they are allowed a sense of 
self-preservation unless it conflicts with the two previous directives.  Even as the laws seem self- 
reinforcing and incontrovertible much of Asimov’s writings and plenty of discussion in the 
decades since they were conceived consider the ways in which they might be circumvented, 
reconsidered, or cast aside in favor of a new understanding.118  Similarly the longstanding “Three 
Nos” are intended to insulate Vietnam from international conflicts and signal to Beijing in 
particular a nonthreatening posture.119  The Three Nos can be summarized as “no military 
alliances, no aligning with one country against another and no foreign military bases on 
Vietnamese Soil.”120 
Building to Cooperation:  
 Just as Asimov’s three laws are a subject of debate within both the scientific and 
philosophical communities Vietnam’s Four Nos leave potential wiggle room for diplomatic and 
military engagement.  Using the “Campaigning Through Cooperation” framing from the JCS 
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Competition Continuum I examined the ways SOF can be used to aid Vietnam without 
compromising the integrity of their stated defense prohibitions.121 
Table 1. Cooperating within the four nos. 
 
Applying this conceptualization to each of the Four Nos we can tease out how SOF can 
aid Vietnam in capacity building and therefore make it more effective in balancing against China 
and potentially establish a more substantial framework of cooperation with the US in the future. 
Using SOF to Get Around ‘No’: 
Vietnam is reticent to codify security arrangements with other states due to its history of 
conflict with larger powers and not wanting to commit to aiding an ally in a conflict in which 
Vietnam has no interest.  As Derek Grossman and Dung Huynh note however this predilection 
for no alliances and non-alignment just pertains to a formalized arrangement which does not 
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preclude the possibility of other forms of military exchange and security cooperation.122  
Looking at table 1, SOF can “engage selectively” with Vietnam across the spectrum of its legally 
proscribed roles.  Special Operations Forces are ideal for engaging in these kinds of transactional 
arrangements and can coordinate efforts across a variety of functions.  Vietnam is undertaking 
more comprehensive defense modernization and spending in reaction to Chinese aggression, 
signaling to China and potential international allies an increased willingness to push back.123  In 
2016 the Obama Administration abolished restrictions on the sale of lethal arms to Vietnam just 
as the country was looking to acquire more effective foreign arms as well as buttress its own 
defense industry.124  Taken together these actions signal a still informal but more welcoming 
attitude toward foreign military assistance.  
US Special Operations can step into a kind of advisory role familiar to their operating 
ethos in other countries around the world.  The US could make SOF advisors available to train 
the Vietnamese on some of these new weapon systems it has purchased in conjunction with its 
recent defense budget increases, Vietnam is spending more on new weapons and equipment than 
any other ASEAN country with a budget of around 5.8 billion dollars as of 2018.125  While many 
of these systems are foreign and directed mainly and better outfitting their conventional forces, 
linking the operation of new submarines and surface craft to an enhanced joint force framework 
they are pursuing would benefit from SOF expertise in coordinating distributed operations, 
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establishing secure lines of communication and linking air and sea assets over long distances.126  
Additionally, Vietnam has purchased new small arms licenses from Israel and is developing the 
ability to produce NATO caliber ammunition which US Special Operations have extensive 
experience in fielding and training local partners.127   
  Beyond an overt SFA mission the most effective route for SOF to take especially 
considering the potential political and bureaucratic constraints associated with Vietnam’s human 
rights record is a civil affairs mission.  Establishing a more substantial bilateral defense 
relationship begins with building rapport and demonstrating the value SOF can bring to Vietnam.  
Similar to operations the 1st Special Forces Group undertook in Asia during the Vietnam War era 
CA teams could institute inoculation drives, construction projects and improving water treatment 
systems alongside military engineers.128 Another potential avenue to exploit is veterinary care 
and animal husbandry efforts just as they had done when deployed to Ryukyu Islands in the 
1970’s.129  Vietnam also has concerns around mine sweeping and removal on land and at sea.  
Vietnam has a mixed array of naval minesweepers from Italy and Russia, that may not 
necessarily be a barrier to entry even if SOF trainers are less familiar with foreign equipment, 
Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) has adapted itself to improving demining 
efforts across Asia and one of the principal areas of focus is improving mine detection and 
awareness.130 It is also worth noting that some of mines and unexploded ordinance still 
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operational or unaccounted for were either copies of US ordinance or perhaps munitions left 
behind by the US during the war so the US can bring both historical expertise and a commitment 
to right past mistakes.131  In particular Joe Lokey notes that Vietnam at the time of his writing 
were in need of improving mine detection in their shallow coastal waters an area where US 
Naval Special Warfare teams can support and train Vietnamese crews and drivers in detecting 
and clearing without necessarily engaging in the activities themselves, which as Lokey notes was 
prohibited and will likely remain prohibited as part of any new training agreement.132 
SOF assistance in supporting and strengthening Vietnam’s domestic and civil affairs can 
also buttress it against both internal divisions as well as the potential for future Chinese influence 
operations.  China is increasingly blending information operations with cyberspace, as they seek 
the blur the distinctions between operations undertaken during wartime and those that are part of 
an informatized approach to achieving their foreign policy objectives.133  An area where SOF CA 
excel is in engagement with local forces and populations as part of a CNDE approach.134  Within 
a cooperation framework CA and PO teams can recognize where tensions might be exploited and 
buttress notational institutions to better their serve populations as well as support efforts to 
counter adversary information operations.  Making use of these largely non-aggressive 
approaches to capacity building SOF can engage with Vietnam on its terms within the JCS 
Competition Continuum framing,135 engaging selectively with the Vietnamese while solidifying a 
cooperative relationship that does not compromise their commitment to non-aggression and non-
alignment.  Perhaps most importantly SOF can operate in Vietnam with more limited resources 
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and facilities in contrast to more conventional US military operations.  The Vietnamese ‘no’ 
regarding no foreign bases is firm but that has not stopped them from leasing facilities to foreign 
powers including the Russian military at Cam Ranh Bay from 1978 to 2002.136  Similarly SOF 
does not require any sort of formal arrangement for basing and facilities or sustaining their 
purpose in country, particularly one where there is no expectation of direct hostilities.  US 
special operations can make use of whatever arrangement the Vietnamese determine is 
conducive to coordinating activities and, in most cases, the closer SOF operate to indigenous 
personnel the better.   
Ultimately in terms of the US engaging Vietnam in security cooperation both countries 
are building from scratch.  While Vietnam’s preference for non-alignment and non-aggression 
limits the ability to advance security cooperation according to Competition Continuum there are 
still opportunities to work with Vietnam in ways that allow it to contend with more effectively 
and balance against Chinese aggression and coercion.  The mere fact that Vietnam is 
increasingly determined to improve its military capabilities bodes well for US and Vietnamese 
engagement in the future if a cooperative relationship can be more firmly established.  Using 
SOF to work with the Vietnamese military in humanitarian assistance, recognizing and 
countering foreign influence operations, and improving training and coordination in anticipation 
of territorial altercations maintains Vietnam’s commitment to non-alignment and non-aggression.  
The US aim in the current moment is less to turn Vietnam into a potential base of operations and 
more helping Vietnam establish itself as a power confident in its capability to deter Chinese 
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Like Vietnam the bulk of conflicts between China and the Philippines are related to 
maritime and territorial disputes.  There exists some uncertainty however about which direction 
the Philippines will take as President Duterte has sought closer relations with China during his 
term.137  This contrasts with the upper echelons of the Filipino military who see China’s 
increased assertiveness particularly over the last few decades as a serious encroachment that 
requires increased pushback.138  Increasingly the Filipino military is sending more ships to press 
the rights of its fishermen which like Vietnam saw a fishing boat rammed and sank by a CCG 
vessel necessitating a rescue of the crew.139  According to the Asia Times many in the Filipino 
military are lobbying Duterte to fully reinstate the US-Philippines VFA as a means of securing 
defense cooperation between both countries.140  Michael J. Green and Gregory B. Poling in a 
hypothetical memorandum to President Biden laid out why a suspension of the VFA would make 
continued inaction of the 1951 US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) a practical 
impossibility.141  Green and Poling argue that loss of defensive cooperation with the Philippines 
would leave US defense planners scrambling to meet response requirements in the South China 
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Sea should the AFP find themselves under attack.142  Similarly Hal Brands argues that a good 
strategic relationship with the Philippines is essential for securing the southern flank of critical 
US partners like South Korea and Japan.143  While Duterte has embraced Beijing’s offers of 
economic development assistance, including allowing Huawei to build out its 5G network, 
China’s influence over the Philippines is increasingly compromised by its aggressive coast guard 
actions in the South Pacific.144 
The Second Thomas Shoal Standoff: 
In 1999 the Philippines navy deliberately ran aground a WWII era cargo ship the 
BRP Sierra Madre to secure their claim to the Second Thomas Shoal inside the Philippines EEZ 
but whose claim is disputed by China.145  Since that time a contingent of Filipino marines has 
garrisoned the Sierra Madre requiring that the Philippines maintain a capability to resupply the 
outpost as well as repair and refurbish the ship to continue to make it habitable for the 
garrison.146  This resulted at various times in a standoff between the China Coast Guard and 
Filipino civilian resupply vessels, some of which were intimidated into turning around by the 
CCG.  In 2014 following a period of tense exchanges as the Philippines sought to refurbish the 
Sierra Madre the US lent support to the Philippines position recognizing the Sierra Madre as an 
“outpost” and decrying Beijing’s attempts to interfere with its resupply.147  Following Beijing’s 
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protestations a sea based resupply mission was launched with members of the international press 
aboard the vessel, a CCG cutter made some attempt to dissuade the mission but the Filipino 
vessel managed to maneuver to the outpost, offload its cargo as well as replacements for the 
garrison and depart the following day.148  While the situation on the Second Thomas Shoal is an 
example of Filipino resistance to Chinese coercion it remains a point of contention between the 
two countries.  Like China’s seizure of the Scarborough Shoal in 2012, the Second Thomas 
Shoal demonstrates the challenges faced by countries regionally in challenging China’s claims to 
disputed territory.   
Discussion 
 
The Philippines National Security Policy for 2017-2022 lays out eight goals and strategic 
objectives for ensuring national harmony and safeguarding their sovereignty and territory.  While 
most of their policy goals relate to matters of domestic security and stability, two relate to the 
Philippines conduct internationally, safeguard the territorial integrity and sovereignty, and 
contribute to international peace.149  Each objective outlines four points to be addressed, the 
following tables look at points of intersection between the Competition Continuum and its 
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Table 3. Buttressing international relationships. 
 
A History of Cooperation: 
It is important to restate there is a long history of security cooperation between the 
Philippines and the MDT with the ongoing discussions around the VFA.  There was also the 
recent and extended period of advice and assist operations from SOF to the AFP as part of 
Operation Enduring Freedom.150  This extensive history of cooperation between the US and the 
Philippines stands in contrast to Vietnam where engagement is increasing but there is an aversion 
to more formal security cooperation.  The Philippines has a wider array of security concerns 
historically which the SOF engagement was aimed at addressing over the roughly 14 years of 
Operation Enduring Freedom – Philippines.151 Most prominently these missions included 
counterterrorism and capacity building operations for the AFP,152 but many of the lessons 
imparted are not wholly distinct from those that can be applied or reoriented in countering 
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Chinese aggression within their national territory or around its periphery.  US special operations 
forces did not engage in direct action against insurgents and terrorists like the Abu Sayyaf Group 
(ASG), but they did aid the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) in improving 
capabilities, conducting CA, and improving their information operations with the civilian 
population.153 
The China Challenge: 
 Fundamentally many of the challenges facing the Philippines require the buttressing of 
international institutional arrangements and reinforcing opportunities for dialogue with China 
and other regional partners in limiting the potential for altercations.  Looking at Table 2 and the 
Philippines strategic objectives however there are opportunities for SOF to help, engage, 
maintain, and advance support for the Philippines in countering Chinese aggression in the SCS 
and West Philippine Sea (WPS).  Considering the previous engagement during Operation 
Enduring Freedom – Philippines SOF could certainly assist the AFP with improving training and 
pursuing defense modernization in the face of changing Chinese tactics in the SCS.  China’s 
asymmetric approach in employing its maritime militia and CCG vessels suggest that an 
unconventional warfare (UW) strategy could be adapted to reestablish deterrence in the 
SCS/WPS.  The aim would be not to engage Chinese vessels in open hostilities but to employ 
new tactics to better assert Filipino claims over territory firmly within their EEZ.  As it is laid out 
in their strategy the Philippines is committed to enhancing its bilateral and multilateral 
arrangements particularly as it relates to more effectively codifying and enforcing the 
Declaration of Conduct (DOC) and Code of Conduct (COC) governing interactions in the 
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SCS.154  Most of these approaches will not involve SOF or the US more broadly in improving 
regional security but SOF can assist the Philippines in much the same way they can assist 
Vietnam.  Looking at the last column of Table 3 SOF can help contribute across the cooperation 
continuum to the Philippines initiative to better “Expand security, defense, social and economic 
diplomacy in support of the national vision and the country’s security and development agenda,” 
in any number of ways.155  SOF can provide enhanced SFA to the Philippines as they 
increasingly seeking to improve their flexibility in improving their security umbrella over the 
roughly 7,600 islands that make up their archipelago.156   
The Philippine Marine Corps (PMC) is pursuing a new doctrine termed the Archipelagic 
Coastal Defense (ACD) which increasingly emphasized interoperability with other elements of 
the AFP.157  Like Vietnam the AFP and specifically the PMC are seeking to improve joint 
operations and enhance their capabilities in response to China’s disaggregated approach and 
increase their capabilities more broadly to safeguard maritime law and improve internal 
security.158  Given the density of littoral and riverine regions to patrol US SOF can assist the 
PMC in the training and employment of small boats operations to more rapidly disperse their 
forces or respond to an aggressor whether that is China or another threat actor.  US Special 
Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC) conducted joint exercises with several Asian and South 
American nations including the Philippines in June and July of 2020 in Hawaii where SOCPAC 
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elements rehearsed deploying small boats from submarines.159   These types of roles can also 
serve an important CA function enhancing the capabilities of the AFP to conduct theater search 
and rescue capabilities when dealing with China in the SCS or responding to an urgent 
humanitarian crisis akin to how the 1st Special Forces Group responded to a typhoon on the 
Island of Luzon in 1972.160  At a minimum SOCOM’s core functions of SFA, FID and UW can 
support the PMC’s mission to better organize their newly established Coastal Defense Regiment 
(CDR) in its role to of safeguarding Filipino national territory and its naval forces from foreign 
aggressors.161  
 One specific opportunity is related to the Sierra Madre, the occasional need to rotate the 
garrison there provides the US an opportunity to further support the Filipino claim over the 
Second Thomas Shoal.  The US can extend an offer for elements from United States Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) to establish a temporary presence alongside AFP personnel 
to support the Filipino claim over the Second Thomas Shoal.  As stated, the US lent support to 
Filipino claim in 2014 and brought international media attention to disputes with China in the 
WPS.162  By further extending a US commitment to place personnel within the Sierra Madre it 
could help signal resolve on the part of the Philippines and US to show both states are committed 
to WPS settlement management as described in Table 2 and advancing defense diplomacy in 
Table 3 in line with the broader aims of the Philippines National Security Policy.  This kind of 
cooperation helps address China’s broader approach in the SCS.  China characterizes the actions 
of its neighbors when they assert their rights as “provocative” and any kind of US presence as 
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“meddling” in their regional affairs.163  What the Philippines NSP makes clear however is there 
are abiding concerns around solidifying codes of conduct to reduce overall tension in the region 
as well as secure their economic and diplomatic rights to transit the SCS/WPS without provoking 
a confrontation.  While the ongoing discussions on the VFA are being considered by President 
Duterte the US can use the lessons of past security cooperation to argue for a phased 
reintroduction of SOF as an opening to demonstrate the viability of advancing cooperation and 
coordination.  Relying on SOF in the early stages of a cooperation campaign would also not 
signal a dramatic influx of resources in a way that would undermine the Philippines broader 
economic ties to Beijing.   
Implications: 
 
 As China grows in influence globally there is no doubt it will generate an outsized 
reaction in how it deals with the neighbors closest to its national territory.  Increasingly China is 
characterizing US involvement in the Asia Pacific as fostering instability and provoking 
confrontation but recurrent clashes with the Vietnam and the Philippines suggest a broader 
resistance to China’s security and development agenda is asserting itself.  Neither Vietnam or the 
Philippines are eager to antagonize China by hosting a significant US military presence but that 
does not preclude the potential for targeted engagement in areas and under circumstances that 
both states could argue are in keeping with enhancing their overall capabilities.  Using SOF as a 
gateway to cooperation even with a state like Vietnam where ideological and economic 
 




differences seemingly constitute a barrier to engagement would likely improve their confidence 
in resisting Beijing in the future and lay the groundwork for more direct military engagement.   
 As other authors have suggested the ongoing pivot to GPC illustrates new challenges 
both for the broader conventional force but perhaps more acutely for SOF as the last several 
decades have been spent meeting an irregular threat with a fusion of unconventional warfare, 
security force assistance, and direct action, areas where SOF can operate somewhat 
independently to lead and excel.  Hal Brands and Tom Nichols argued that SOF will necessarily 
have to accept a diminished role as the US seeks to impose a more comprehensive deterrence 
framework with respect to revisionist actors.164  Brands and Nichols however recognize that 
SOF’s most effective role is in working nominal allies and potential partners in building their 
capabilities and supporting their efforts to resist coercion.165 With this in mind using SOF within 
the Competition Continuum to shore up partner relationships and enhance their potential for 
independent action represents an ideal interim approach to containing China.  Beijing’s reticence 
to take aggressive action that might negatively impact its development agenda argues that more 
assertive deterrence actions by its neighbors would inhibit potential escalation.166  SOF 
assistance in capacity building demonstrates a level of resolve and willingness to engage with 
partners on their terms and in ways that contribute to partner resilience.  Both Vietnam and the 
Philippines have reasonable concerns about how the appearance of alignment with the US will 
draw Beijing’s ire but using SOF should be articulated as part of a larger effort to support their 
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broader security agendas not simply aimed at balancing against or deterring China.  As the 
Competition Continuum notes: 
Campaigning through cooperation requires patience, consistency, and empathy.  The 
most productive relationships take time to build.  A partnership is unlikely to reach its 
potential if the joint force approaches military engagement as discrete events rather than 
as part of a deliberate, continuous process.167 
Using SOF and its varied array of mission specialization to support partners against challenges 
rather than exercising a declarative US policy that forces countries to take sides by hosting 
significant US assets or join in codified security agreements which misses the mark when it 
comes to competing with China below the threshold of armed conflict.  Yes, the US must 
continue to support freedom and prepare to counter China’s increasing Anti-Access and Area 
Denial (A2AD) capabilities but each state in the Asia Pacific is uniquely capable against as well 
uniquely susceptible to China’s active defense approach.  Recognizing that requires a process 
that is locally engaged, demonstrates results, and when welcomed has established support from 
the broader US defense and policy community. It is a circumstance which SOF is uniquely 
qualified to meet. 
Conclusion 
 
 In many respects Vietnam and the Philippines represent good cases for how the US 
should approach states that find themselves torn between the exigencies of trade and 
development and the ongoing challenges competing interstate relations pose to sovereignty.  
 




Both countries are struggling with how forcefully to resist Chinese aggression with their 
respective EEZs but outright alignment with the US leaves them exposed to Chinese economic 
sanction and likely other forms of aggression.  By relying on US Special Operations working 
within the Competition Continuum to illustrate the benefits of limited and transactional security 
cooperation to middle powers the US can work towards a mutually beneficial and adaptable 
framework for potentially more intensive future cooperation.  Neither Vietnam or the Philippines 
desires or reasonably could sever important economic and developmental ties to China.  By 
shoring up however even limited joint security cooperation the US could assist them in 
constraining Beijing’s most aggressive impulses and help inhibit their broader strategic 
ambitions.  What is needed is a more concrete understanding of how Beijing will react to more 
comprehensive joint action between the US and its neighbors on the periphery.  There is every 
reason to expect Beijing will negatively react aggressively to potential US strategic encirclement 
and both Vietnam and the Philippines are reticent to accept any overt US attempts to 
aggressively balance against China.  In this way a consistent SOF presence in these countries 
helps the value of security cooperation both locally and internationally without the alarmism a 
larger military presence may trigger within their own foreign policy establishments or more 
importantly Beijing’s.  As a practical matter more concerted diplomatic engagement with Hanoi 
would be of great benefit in gauging their willingness to accept broader US security assistance.  
Increasing the flow of advanced weapon systems with additional offers of training and support 
could help promote goodwill in the near term and advance discussions on potential strategies to 
counter Chinese coercion.  In the case of the Philippines much will depend on President 
Duterte’s continued extension of the VFA but even that is not definitive as his term comes closer 
to an end.  The Filipino defense establishment seems to favor ongoing security cooperation with 
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the US, so continued engagement with and support for their claims over the WPS is vital to 
demonstrating US commitment to regional stability and support for a code of conduct within 
their respective economic spheres.168  Ultimately the US must demonstrate a willingness to be 
flexible in adapting to each states proscribed needs in the way the US can differentiate itself from 
Beijing’s desire for total primacy over the Asia Pacific.  
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